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Summary
This paper argues that the degree of economic integration may be an
important determinant of the emergence of different patterns of both
technology and ﬁnance in industrializing economies. Drawing on sev-
eral recent advances in corporate ﬁnance, a simple general equilibrium
model is developed which investigates how the degree of economic
integration may affect ﬁrms’ choice of technology, entrepreneurs’
choice of human capital accumulation and banker’s choice of the way
ﬁnance is provided. The degree of economic integration is measured
by the cost of transacting in goods, securities and factors markets. It
is shown that economies which industrialize when they have already
achieved a high degree of integration are more likely to adopt a simple,
fungible technology and rely on arm’s-length ﬁnancial relationships
(the “British” pattern). Economies which are still fragmented when they
industrialize are instead more likely to adopt more speciﬁc technology
and rely on the close ﬁnancial ties of relationship-banking (the “Ger-
man” pattern). The model also provides an explanation for the per-
sistence of the patterns of industrialization as economic integration
increases. It is argued that the ﬁxed costs of relationship-banking, and
their effect on the likelihood of early liquidation of ﬁrms, explains
why integration that occurs after industrialization may exhibit “path-
dependence”, and preserve the existing patterns of both technology
and ﬁnance. These results are used to interpret the early in-
dustrialization of Britain and Germany, and the persistence of their
patterns with time. Ó 1997 Academic Press Limited
J.E.L. Classiﬁcation: G21, N23, O14, O16.
Keywords: Comparative ﬁnancial systems, technology adoption,
British and German industrialization, economic integration.
1. Introduction
Economists have given much attention to the effects of ﬁnance on
ﬁrms’ attitude towards innovation and risk-taking (see, for in-
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stance, Mayer, 1990; Roe, 1993; Aoki & Patrick, 1994; Edwards &
Fischer, 1994). This has led to the identiﬁcation of different pat-
terns, which are interpreted as alternative equilibria which an
economy may attain, like the “Anglo-Saxon”, the “German” and
the “Japanese” ones. While much research has gone into the nature
of the complementarities which sustain these different patterns,
less attention has been given to what determines their selection.
We contribute to this line of research, showing that economic
integration may determine the emergence of different patterns of
industrial ﬁnance and of industrial innovation at the early stages
of industrialization. We also provide conditions under which either
persistence (“path-dependence”) or convergence attain.
We develop a simple general equilibrium model to formalize the
idea that close banking relationships are costly but enhance the
value of projects by overcoming informational asymmetries, thus
lowering the probability of inefﬁcient liquidation. Arm’s-length
banking relationships, on the contrary, entail a lower cost of
individual loans, but require a market for liquid claims which is
costly to operate. Since with bank-based ﬁnance a ﬁrm faces
liquidation less often, it ﬁnds it more convenient to adopt riskier
technologies and more speciﬁc human capital than under arm’s-
length ﬁnancing. This gives rise to a multiplicity of equilibria.
There is a “British” equilibrium, with arm’s-length ﬁnancing, little
investment in human capital and more fungible technology, and a
“German” equilibrium, with close banking relationships and more
human capital and speciﬁc technology.
We use the degree of economic integration as the determinant
of equilibrium selection, through its effects on the cost of ﬁnance
and production. Low integration entails less mobility of factors
and higher transportation costs, and more costly execution of
ﬁnancial transactions. We show that there is a critical value of the
degree of integration below which the “British” equilibrium is not
feasible, allowing only the “German” equilibrium. We then show
that when an economy integrates after having industrialized, it is
likely to retain the “German” pattern—even if it would have
adopted the “British” pattern had it industrialized after in-
tegration. This is because banking relationships have economic
value.
Our model allows us a new interpretation of the rise and per-
sistence of differences in British and German industrialization.
While Britain was a uniﬁed nation from the beginning, Germany
industrialized as a set of fragmented economic regions, which
progressedtowardsunityonlyslowlyandgradually.Onceitbecame
economically uniﬁed, its pattern of ﬁnance and investment did not
revert to the British one, and the differences between the two
countries persisted.
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the complementarities between ﬁnancial and industrial systems,
of which Aoki (1994) was one of the ﬁrst examples. It takes as a
starting point the large amount of literature showing that close
banking relationships may overcome informational inefﬁciencies
and support risky, long-term investment strategies (see, for in-
stance, Townsend, 1979; Gale & Hellwig, 1985; Rajan, 1992; De-
watripont & Maskin, 1995; von Thadden, 1995). We borrow from
the literature on venture capital the view that bank-based ﬁnance
may contribute to the value of a project by raising its probability of
success (see Gorman & Sahlman, 1986; Hellmann, 1994; Gompers,
1995). In an industrializing economy it seems appropriate to liken
banks to venture capital, as they often act as a substitute for the
lackofprofessionalcorporateservices,andfaceacuteinformational
asymmetries. Banks are also considered a useful institution to
help ﬁrms identify and realize investment complementarities in
developing economies (Da Rin & Hellmann, 1996). Another way
relationship banking contributes to a project’s value is by favouring
debt renegotiations for distressed ﬁrms to a greater extent than
market-based ﬁnance (Berlin & Loeys, 1988).
The only closely related paper, to the best of our knowledge, is by
BaligaandPolak(1995),wholookatthepersistenceofinstitutional
differences in the ﬁnal quarter of the last century. They, too,
examine the coordination between ﬁnancial and industrial strat-
egies, but focus on scale of projects and numerosity of ﬁrms, and
justify ﬁnancial intermediation with presence of moral hazard.
The two papers are indeed complementary. The rest of the paper
proceeds as follows. Part two develops the model. Part three
uses it to provide a reading of the British and German histories,
comparing their main features. Some ﬁnal remarks conclude.
2. The model
2.1. THE REAL SECTOR
We consider a simple overlapping generations economy, where a
measure one continuum of agents live for two periods each gen-
eration. Agents are risk-neutral and care only for second period
consumption.Thus,allincomeissaved,andinvestedattheinterest
rate r, which is constant and exogenously determined in the world
markets. Each young agent is endowed with one unit of labour,
which is supplied inelastically at the market wage rate wt, where
t denotes time. While working, each agent decides whether to set
up a ﬁrm, or a bank, or to become a broker. We denote the amount
of ﬁrms (ﬁnancial intermediaries) in equilibrium by Ft and Bt,
respectively.† An agent who decides to become an entrepreneur
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expends (costly) effort ev[0, 1] to set up his ﬁrm. Effort represents
accumulation of project-speciﬁc human capital. Firms and ﬁnancial
intermediaries are set up by a single agent. When old, agents will
consume all their savings. Those who have become entrepreneurs
(bankers, brokers) run their ﬁrm (intermediary) and consume its
proﬁts.
There is one good in the economy, which can be consumed or
employed as capital, and is used as the numeraire. Production
requires labour and a ﬁxed amount of capital, normalized to one.
In each generation, some young agents set up ﬁrms and borrow
capital.† In the second period workers are hired, production takes
place and debt is repaid. Capital used in production completely
depreciates at the end of the second period.
Firms and ﬁnancial intermediaries are distributed uniformly
over a circle with unitary circumference. Thus, Ft and Bt express
the relative, “per capita” amount of ﬁrms and intermediaries. After
it has been set up, each ﬁrm (bank) is randomly assigned to a
location.
There are two available technologies. The “fungible” ( f) tech-
nologyentailsalowerproductivitythanthe“speciﬁc”(s)technology.
On the other hand, the speciﬁc technology requires a higher
specializationofcapital,whichmakesitlesssuitableforalternative
uses, and accelerates capital depreciation. Let sv{f,s} be the index
of technology, and let g(n) be a well-behaved production function,
where n denotes the amount of labour employed. Output is
a(s,e)g(nt), where a is a time-invariant index of productivity which
depends on technology and effort, such that a(s,.) > a(f, .) for all
levels of effort. Also, let t(s) be the (liquidation) value of capital in
alternative uses at the end of the ﬁrst period, with 1=l(f)>l(s).
Thus, the speciﬁc technology allows higher productivity, but at the
cost of reducing the value of capital in alternative uses.
There is uncertainty on the outcome of production, since the
project might fail due to an idiosyncratic shock. At the end of the
ﬁrst period, once a ﬁrm has been organized, but before production
takes place, a signal S on the level of productivity becomes avail-
able, which cannot be contracted upon.‡ The signal can be “good”
(S=g) with probability b, or “bad” (S=b) with probability (1-b).
A bad signal reveals negative information which decreases the
† We make the plausible assumption that the amount of capital necessary to
set up the ﬁrm is much greater than the wage rate. Consequently entrepreneurs
need to borrow from many lenders.
‡ This is because the signal reveals “soft” information which cannot be enforced
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where c>r(b)>r(g)=0. Since at the end of the ﬁrst period capital
has a value l(s), it is efﬁcient to liquidate the ﬁrm whenever l(s)
exceeds the expected value of continuing the project. Here is where
ﬁnance enters our model, as the liquidation decision depends on
how ﬁrms are ﬁnanced.
2.2. THE FINANCIAL SECTOR
Firms can raise funds by issuing securities or by applying for
a bank loan. Market-based ﬁnance entails distant, arm’s-length
relationships between borrowers and lenders, whose interaction is
organized by “brokers”. They collect standard accounting in-
formation from ﬁrms in order to market their securities, which
aretradedin acentralmarket.Thecost oforganizingandoperating
a market for public debt is essentially a ﬁxed cost, shared equally
between all borrowers.‡ More precisely, we assume that the mar-
ginal cost borne by a borrower is k(Ft), with k(0)=¥, k¢<0, and
k²>0. This amounts to say that there are external economies in
organizing a market for securities, so that the cost of ﬁnance is
driven essentially by the size of the market. Such economies exist
because the cost of organizing the circulation of securities is
substantially higher than the costs of gathering accounting in-
formation, which is constant for all ﬁrms, and equal to b ˆ. Finally,
a broker has to pay a cost f
m to acquire the ability to intermediate
securities.§
Bank-based ﬁnance, instead, entails close borrower–lender re-
lationships, and the costly collection and processing of detailed
“soft”information.Relationshipbankinghasbeenshowntosupport
riskier and longer-term investment strategies (see our discussion
above). We take this as our starting point, and assume that bank-
based ﬁnance enhances the probability of success of a project
through (costly) monitoring. More precisely, a bank which has
† Alternatively, the bad signal could correspond to a negative shock on the
value of the project when it succeeds. Since agents are risk-neutral the two are
equivalent.
‡ The logic of our argument is clearly robust to any split of such costs between
lenders and borrowers.
§ This can be viewed as the cost of a charter, or the capital required to operate
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acquired monitoring capacity can raise the probability of success
of a ﬁrm which received a signal S=b from (c-r(b)) back to c.†
To acquire monitoring capacity at the time of setting up the bank,
the banker bears a cost f
b. Unlike market-based ﬁnance, there are
no external economies of scale—an extreme result of our simple
formalization.
To keep the analysis simple we assume that bank-based ﬁnance
is extended through standard debt contracts, with a covenant
which gives lenders the right to terminate projects once the signal
on productivity becomes known. Following Sussman (1993), we
also assume that the cost of monitoring a ﬁrm with distance z
from the bank is equal to b(z), with b¢(z)>0. Since banks are
equidistant from each other, the distance between any two of them
is 1/Bt, which contains Ft/Bt ﬁrms (in per capita terms). It is easy
to show that there is a unique Nash equilibrium of the lending
game between two neighbouring banks, in which each bank offers
loans only to ﬁrms closer than 1/2Bt. As the bank knows a ﬁrm’s
location, it can price-discriminate, and ask for a repayment con-
strained by the cost of monitoring its neighbouring bank. Figure
A plots the cost functions of two neighbouring banks. The shaded
areas measure the monopolistic rent accruing to each bank. Also,
the bank can credibly commit to repay its depositors whenever it
is solvent. This is because its local nature allows depositors to
oversee its operations at a reasonably small cost. The market for
deposits is instead assumed to be perfectly competitive. Finally,
we let b ˆ=b(0).
The timing of actions, for each generation, is as follows. In the
ﬁrst period, young agents work for existing ﬁrms and decide
whether to set up a ﬁrm or become bankers (brokers). Wages are
saved and deposited with a bank, or invested in the capital market.
Agents who set up a ﬁrm choose one of the two technologies,
accumulate human capital and borrow one unit of capital. Those
who set up a bank, build monitoring capacity and collect deposits,
and those who become brokers set up a central market for liquid
claims. Firms and banks are randomly assigned a location, which
becomes common knowledge. Signals on productivity are revealed,
and lenders decide whether to extend each loan or to terminate
the project. In the second period bank monitoring takes place,
securities are issued, ﬁrms hire workers and the product is pro-
duced and sold. Finally, uncertainty on project outcome is realized
and creditors are repaid by successful ﬁrms.
† We overlook the possibility that monitoring raises the probability of success
of a ﬁrm which has received a signal S=g, since it would add nothing to the




FIGURE A. Cost of bank-based ﬁnance.
2.3. THE LIQUIDATION DECISION
A crucial feature of our model is the liquidation decision, which
creates a link between ﬁrms’ choice of technology and the nature
of the ﬁnancial system. Liquidation occurs whenever the expected
value under continuation is smaller than the liquidation value l(s).
We naturally assume that the expected value of the ﬁrm when S=
g is greater than its liquidation value—otherwise the ﬁrm would
not have been set up in the ﬁrst place. When S=b the two forms
of ﬁnance entail different expected values. In order to concentrate
on the economically interesting case, we assume that with market-
based ﬁnance, denoted by M, liquidation occurs irrespective of
technology:
EM[y(nt,s,e)|S=b]=[c-r(b)]a(s,e)g(nt)<l(s) (1)
for s=f,s. With bank-based ﬁnance, denoted by B, monitoring
restores the initial probability of success:M. DA RIN 178
EB[y(nt,s,e)|S=b]=ca(s,e)g(nt)>l(s) (2)
for s=f,s.† This assumption reﬂects the fact that bank-based
ﬁnance may contribute to the value of a project by raising its
probability of success. This is common in the literature on venture
capital, a form of ﬁnance which is akin to our concept of bank-
based relationship ﬁnance (Gorman & Sahlman, 1986; Hellmann,
1994; Gompers, 1995). It ﬁts the nature of an industrializing
economy, where banks often act as a substitute for the lack of
professional corporate services, and where informational asym-
metries are most acute. Relationship banking also favours debt
renegotiations for distressed ﬁrms more than market-based ﬁn-
ance—increasing the chances of bank survival (Berlin & Loeys,
1988). Banks may also help ﬁrms identify and realize investment
complementarities in developing economies (Da Rin & Hellmann,
1996). Finally, the recent literature on capital structure also sup-
ports our assumption. Williamson (1988) and Shleifer and Vishny
(1992) suggest that the degree of asset speciﬁcity inﬂuences the
governance attributes of alternative forms of ﬁnance. On the other
hand, we take an extreme stance, whereby all ﬁrms which adopt
the same technology and get the same signal are either liquidated
or not; however, the model could be extended to allow for the
case of ﬁrm heterogeneity. This would result in a more selective
liquidation rule, whereby a greater measure of ﬁrms is liquidated
with market-based ﬁnance than with bank-based ﬁnance, but our
qualitative results would be preserved.
2.4. THE CHOICE OF TECHNOLOGY AND EFFORT
Entrepreneurs choose technology in order to maximize their ex-
pected proﬁts. They take into account that S=b may trigger
liquidation, and so weigh the increased productivity with speciﬁc
technologyagainstitslowerliquidationvalue.Ourcharacterization
of the liquidation decision implies that the choice of technology is
determined by the form of external ﬁnance. Our assumptions
create a strong “complementarity” between speciﬁc technology and
bank-based ﬁnance. Bank-based ﬁnance makes speciﬁc technology
more attractive by raising the probability of success of distressed
† This assumption is less restrictive than it appears. It could be shown to
result from a framework where security holders receive an imperfect signal on
ﬁrm productivity, whereas banks’ monitoring capacity enables them to ascertain
the true state of nature. We postulate this result in order to concentrate on the
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projects—those which have received a “bad” signal. Under bank-
based ﬁnance entrepreneurs choose s=s. Likewise, under market-
based ﬁnance they choose s=f. This implication of our assumptions
reﬂects the results of the recent literature.
As for the choice of effort, we naturally assume that a higher e
is more valuable when technology is speciﬁc, namely that ¶a(s, e)/
¶e>¶a(f,e)/¶e for all levels of e. Effort is costly, as measured by a
function u(e), such that u(0)=0, u(1)=¥, u¢(e)>0 and f²(e). This
ensures that the level of effort is higher when techonology is
speciﬁc. We denote it by e ¯, and denote by e the level of effort
(human capital) when technology is fungible. Then 0<e<e ¯<1.
2.5. EQUILIBRIUM WITH BANK-BASED FINANCE
We now compute the equilibrium of our economy, starting with
the case of bank-based ﬁnance. The cost of establishing monitoring
capacity implies that there is only a ﬁnite number of banks.
Equilibrium is given by banks’ zero-proﬁts conditions, which
equates the expected revenue of a bank with the cost of providing
ﬁnance plus the repayment of funds to depositors, taking into
account that banks never liquidate projects. Let R
b
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is the monopolistic rent accruing to each bank when there are Bt
of them. New banks enter until the rent equals the cost of acquiring
monitoring capacity. Labour demand for the individual ﬁrm is
n(w)=(g¢(wt+1))
-1. Aggregate labour demand is then N
b
t=n(wt+1)Ft,
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where operating proﬁts p(wt+1,s,e ¯)oa(s,e ¯)g(n(wt+1))-wt+1n(wt+1)
are decreasing in wt+1, provided the production function is concave





We can now determine the equilibrium of the system by solving
equations (3)–(5) (all proofs are in the Appendix).
PROPOSITION 1: With bank-based ﬁnance, there exists a unique
stable equilibrium.
2.6. EQUILIBRIUM WITH MARKET-BASED FINANCE
With market-based ﬁnance each borrower pays the amount k(Ft).
Let R
m
















† Our assumption of a continuum of agents ensures that there is no scarcity
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Notice that the ﬁxed cost of entry keeps the number of brokers






Since some ﬁrms are now liquidated, aggregate labour demand
is lower than with bank-based ﬁnance:
N
m
t =bn(wt+1)Ft=1( 4 ¢ )
Firms’ expected proﬁts now take into account that ﬁrms which










We can now determine the equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 2: Whenever k¢<k ¯, there exists a unique stable equi-
librium with market-based ﬁnance.
The result can be interpreted with the aid of Figure B, below.
The equilibrium value of Ft is determined by the intersection of
the two curves which represent the right- and left-hand sides of
equation (5¢). Under our assumptions, the right-hand side is higher
at low levels of Ft, and intersects from above the curve cor-
responding to the left-hand side. However, the costs of running a
market for liquid claims might be such that the cost paid by the
marginal ﬁrm is never low enough to make it worth investing,
once we take into account the negative effect that entrance by the
ﬁrm has on proﬁts. In this case the two curves would never cross.
Thus, the nature of k(Ft) is of foremost importance for the model.†
Both the bank-based and the market-based equilibrium are
possible. Since ﬁrms, banks and brokers make zero proﬁts, a
plausible assumption is that the equilibrium which yields the
higher social surplus (net of ﬁnance costs) will be selected. This
† It is conceivable that multiple equilibria may exist should k(Ft) turn upwards
and above a certain level of Ft. This might be due to a “congestion” effect, which
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FIGURE B. Equilibrium with market-based ﬁnance.
depends on the actual constellation of parameters of the economy.
For instance, a high probability of success, b, favours the market-
based equilibrium, as it reduces the value of bank support. An
analysis of equilibrium selection must then specify the different
parameter constellations under which each would attain. Notice
that we have ruled out any “mixed” equilibria, as all agents who
choose to be ﬁnancial intermediaries offer the same type of ﬁnance.
This naturally stems from the fact that, with homogeneous agents,
a mixed equilibrium would entail a duplication of costs which is
inefﬁcient. When ﬁnance is provided through banks, there is a
monopolistic distortion in the pricing of ﬁnancial services. This
has to be compared to the cost of market-based ﬁnance, k(Ft).
Whether the equilibrium number of ﬁrms under market-based
ﬁnance is high enough to make this cost lower than under bank-
based ﬁnance depends on the values of the parameters, as can
seen by comparing equation (5) with equation (5¢). The advantage
of market-based ﬁnance is the low cost of organizing the market
for securities. However, ﬁrms are subject to a higher probability
of default than with bank-based ﬁnance, (1-bc) instead of (1-c),
so that their expected proﬁts are reduced. The net effect, and so
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parameters. We are not interested in analysing these different
constellations, as in considering how they may be affected by the
degree of economic integration. We denote by xm and xb the
constellations of parameters under which the economy achieves
the market-based and the bank-based equilibria, respectively.
2.7. ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
We measure economic integration with the parameter qv[0, 1],
where zero corresponds to complete fragmentation, and one to
complete integration. Integration affects the cost of circulating
capital, labour and goods across the economy. A fragmented eco-
nomy entails customs duties and the cost of billing in different
currencies. Agents bear exchange rate risk, and may have to defend
their property rights under different laws. Workers may not be
able to sell their services where they are most in demand. These
factors inﬂuence the cost of production. We model this using
“iceberg costs”, a standard way to deal with regional barriers to
trade. The idea is that using inputs from different regions and
transporting the ﬁnal products across them is costly. Formally, we
assume that:
y=q[a(s,e)g(nt)] (6)
As a result, lower integration discourages entry into the real
sector. The effect of integration on the ﬁnancial sector depends on
the form of ﬁnance. Bank-based ﬁnance is likely to be little affected
by integration. Close banking relationships are “local” in nature.
We bring this to the extreme, and assume that bank-based ﬁnance
is not affected at all by integration. The cost of market-based
ﬁnance, on the contrary, depends on integration, as securities need
to be packaged in standardized form and circulated. We assume
that the cost of organizing securities markets (for the marginal
ﬁrm) is now k(Ft)/q. The cost of acquiring accounting information,
b ˆ, remains unaffected. Our qualitative results do not depend on
the speciﬁcation of how integration affects the cost of ﬁnance.
What is crucial is that the cost of bank-based ﬁnance is affected
by integration to a lesser extent than the cost of market-based
ﬁnance, expressing the fact that more are “local” in nature than
securities markets. Once an economy becomes more integrated
there are two positive effects on the level of economic activity. The
“direct” effect of integration is due to lower costs of production.
The “indirect” effect occurs only with market-based ﬁnance, as the
cost of intermediating securities decreases.
PROPOSITION 3. There exists a critical level q* such that the equi-
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2.8. PATH-DEPENDENCE
In this section we consider the effect of integration on an in-
dustrialized economy. Consider an economy belonging to xm that
industrializes with a degree of integration q<q*, and so adopts the
bank-based equilibrium. Suppose it later achieves a higher degree
ofintegration,q¢>q*.Willitreverttothemarket-basedequilibrium,
or will it remain locked in the bank-based equilibrium?
We address this question by slightly modifying the process of
intermediation. Firms outlive entrepreneurs, and a successful ﬁrm
starts over at the end of its second period with a new project and
a new entrepreneur. Similarly, banks outlive bankers. We then
assume that the costs of market-based ﬁnance is not affected by
time:circulatingsecuritiesrequiresthesameresourceseachperiod.
The cost of bank-based ﬁnance—which is based on building close
relationships—decreases with time for ﬁrms which have been
successful in the past. In particular, we choose to simply decrease
the cost b(z) by a constant x. This means, not only does the cost of
ﬁnance decrease with time for successful ﬁrms, but they pocket
all the savings as banks keep their rents constant. While the ﬁrst
part of the assumption is crucial, our results are robust to other
sharing rules.†
The simplifying nature of our assumptions rules out mixed
equilibria, as well as the possibility for successful ﬁrms to “build
a reputation” and become able to issue securities. This reﬂects our
focus on the evolution of an economy’s pattern of ﬁnance and
investment, and not on the ﬁnancing options available to single
ﬁrms as in Diamond (1991). In a developed economy with mature
ﬁnancial markets, it is likely that ﬁrms may exploit different forms
of ﬁnancing. Our goal, instead, is to show that such availability of
ﬁnancing options may not arise in the ﬁrst place.‡
Since each period cF* b ﬁrms survive on to the next period, their
banking relationships survive as well. It is easy to check that this
amount of ﬁrms is also time-invariant. Consequently, the total
† The way we model cost reduction is over-simplistic, but it can account for
several alternatives. A richer model would build endogenously the changes in
the rent and in its distribution. For instance, Dinc (1996) studies the effects of
bond market deregulation on ﬁrm borrowing choices using an inﬁnitely repeated
game framework. There, persistence of close banking relationships is based on
banks’ need to build a reputation for adopting efﬁcient liquidation decisions.
Baliga and Polak (1995), instead, base their analysis on a multiple-stage game
where different levels of the (endogenously determined) cost of monitoring induces
different equilibria.
‡ In the next section we will see that many German ﬁrms issued equity and
bonds. Yet, they did so under the strict tutelage of banks, which dominated the
issue business. This was clearly a case where bank-based ﬁnance “captured” the
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(per period) cost saving, with respect to the static model, is equal
to xcF* b. Our last result is then:
PROPOSITION 4: Suppose an economy with parametric structure
within xm has industrialized with a degree of integration q0<q*,
thus adopting the bank-based equilibirium. Suppose that the eco-
nomy later achieves a higher degreee of integration, q1>q*. Then it
will revert to market based ﬁnance only if c<c* 1.
3. Finance and technology in British and German
industrialization
We can now use our results to interpret the early industrialization
of Britain and Germany.† This corresponds to the period between
1750 and 1820 in Britain, and between 1830 and 1870 in Germany
(see Gerschenkron, 1962; Crafts, Leybourne & Mills, 1991). Once
joint-stock companies were allowed, issues of market structure
and scale of production came to play a major role, for which our
model is not adequate.
3.1. ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
Britain and Germany reached industrialization at different stages
of economic integration. Britain became a nation before in-
dustrializing, resulting in a high integration of product, labour
and capital markets. Reliance on nationwide markets was favoured
by common currency, a common business culture and homogeneous
enforcement and legal systems. Thus, secured ﬁnancial claims
became widely accepted, since creditors were conﬁdent in the
possibility of recovering their credits in case of bankruptcy. The
evolution of modern commercial law at the beginning of the 18th
century,wasalsofavourabletotheuseoftradedsecurities(Cottrell,
1980: p. 6). Integration allowed the free circulation of factors of
production, as well as of entrepreneurs. Secondary markets for
capital and machinery were also active (Landes, 1965: p. 297;
Milward & Saul, 1973: pp. 190–191; Mathias, 1979: p. 96). The
high natality and death rate in British industry contributed to
create a market for salaried managers (Cottrell, 1980: p. 35).
This encouraged entrepreneurs to invest in skills which could be
† A huge literature has developed on all facets of the industrialization of both
countries and the way it was ﬁnanced. Among many others, on Britain, see King
(1936), Deane (1965), Landes (1965), Cameron (1967), Crouzet (1982), Collins
(1984), Kindleberger (1984), Crafts (1985) and Kennedy (1992). On Germany, see
Tilly (1966, 1989), H. Pohl (1984), M. Pohl (1982), Henderson (1984), Kindleberger
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exploited in many situations, so that the failure of one venture
would not lead to personal disruption. Indeed, many entrepreneurs
started over several times, shifting among related businesses.
In Germany, on the contrary, the fragmented nature of local
economies persisted throughout the early stages of in-
dustrialization. There were still 38 states after Versailles, with
different legal systems (Code Napoleon, Roman law, Saxon law),
currencies (seven different systems), social structures, business
attitudes and even measurement systems (Clapham, 1955: p. 88).
Integration of these economies was slow and partial. Even Prussia,
the largest and dominant state, was divided in two large areas,
Rhenania and Westphalia in the West, and Saxony in the East
(Borchardt,1991).Suchdivisionshamperedthecreationofcommon
markets for goods and production factors. For instance, guild
regulations limited the mobility of skilled labour well into the
1870s (Tripton, 1976: ch. 3). The ﬁrst step towards a “national
economic space” was the creation of the Customs Union (Zollverein)
in 1834. Henderson (1984) describes the difﬁculties faced by the
Zollverein in its development. He shows how little it contributed
to enforcement of property rights, coinage and business practices.
The Zollverein expanded slowly. During the 1850s and 1860s an
increasing number of states joined it, but it was only with the
Northern German Confederation (1866) that a uniﬁed economic
space started to appear. Even tariff elimination was not sufﬁcient
to achieve true integration. Dunke (1991) stresses the regional
nature of German industrialization, and Tripton (1976: pp. 35–36,
and 66–67) forcefully shows that regional specialization was very
low throughout the 1860s, and inter-regional trade weak. The
Western regions were the ﬁrst to form a large integrated economic
area, with relatively free markets for goods, capital and labour;
they werealso theﬁrst toindustrialize.† Uniﬁcation(1871) brought
political unity, but effective integration required even more time.
A Prussian commercial code was introduced only in 1869, and a
German one only in 1898 (Pohl, 1982: p. 171).
3.2. BRITAIN
Britain started industrializing from the 1750s, pioneering the
Industrial Revolution. Until the 1820s, incorporation of ﬁrms and
banks was obstacled by legislation and business practices. Firms
† Important in this respect was the construction of the railways network in
the 1840s and 1850s (Fremdling, 1991). It had a positive effect on import
substitution of iron materials and adoption of modern technology. Domestic
production of locomotives, then complicated state-of-the-art machines, was very
quick: by 1852 60% of them were made in Germany (Milward & Saul, 1973: p.
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were typically small partnerships. British entrepreneurs were
“men of trade”, with a particular attitude for achieving rational
organizationofsimpleformsofproduction—asforcefullyillustrated
by Landes (1965).† Their success rested largely on introducing
more effective forms of production which directly responded to an
existing demand.‡ Indeed, British industrialization was based
mostly on consumer goods. A capital goods industry developed only
in the early 19th century, when demand for spinning and weaving
machines, and for power engines became strong and stable. Till
then it was common for entrepreneurs to contract craftsmen to
build simple machines and standardized tools, for which wood was
often used rather than iron.
Our model holds that complementarity between ﬁnance and
technology is such that an integrated economy is likely to in-
dustrialize by adopting simple technology and safe forms of pro-
duction. This was indeed true in the case of Britain. British
entrepreneurs improved on existing techniques without engaging
in the systematic development of new products or processes. They
rarely had formal technical training. They were often enriched
traders or artisans with ingenious—but informal—knowledge of
their ﬁeld, who tinkered and improved on others’ experiments.
Even inventors were more practical men than scientists. Watt and
Newcomen, who made the use of steam power possible, were
skilled, creative artisans. The development of thermodynamics
came after their intuitions, and was pursued at the French E ￿ole
Politechnique (Landes, 1965: p. 333).
Wrigley (1987) documents such different attitudes of British and
German entrepreneurs. This was certainly the case for textiles,
where the adoption of technical improvements was largely due to
the tinkering effort of entrepreneurs, who never showed a sys-
tematic approach towards developing new processes.§ Many in-
ventions were the fruit of serendipitous activity. Mechanization
and steam power were adopted slowly and only became widespread
in the 19th century (Crouzet, 1982: pp. 198–204). For instance,
Cartwright’s power loom (1787) remained a technical novelty until
after the Napoleonic Wars. Such slow adoption of innovations was
sometimes due to the need to reorganize the whole production
process to accommodate them, which was in itself a risky decision.
† For instance, Landes (1965: pp. 298, 321 and 580–581). This view is shared
by Payne (1974: pp. 13–24) and by Crouzet (1982: pp. 185, and 199–200).
‡ See Landes (1965: p. 334), and Payne (1978: pp. 186–187). One instance was
that of the progress in bleaching and dyes which was generated by the needs of
the textile industry (Landes, 1965: p. 338).
§ See Landes (1965) and Crouzet (1982). Germany was quick to catch up in
worsted textiles, where mechanization was more intense, and on a scale larger
than in cotton (Milward & Saul, 1973: p. 399). Germany even became a large
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The introduction of Cort’s process for iron puddling was one such
instance (Musson, 1979: pp. 98–99). The process, patented in 1873,
became widely adopted in only the 1790s, when several iron
masters—reassured of its viability—started investing large sums
in it. Once difﬁculties were encountered in experiments, these
were left aside until an alternative became available thus making
it attractive to pursue them further.† The lag between “invention”
and “innovation” was often long.‡ Interestingly, a pattern of simple
production and innovation was typical not only of textiles, but of
all sectors. This kept the riskiness of new ventures low. The
progress in alkalis (bleaching powder) was due to the incremental
ﬁndings of a few “empiricists” (Landes, 1965: pp. 339–343). The
Leblanc soda process, patented in 1780, was adopted in only the
1820s. As Landes (1965: p. 343) wrote, “many of the advances
were the work of self-taught ‘chemists’ and the more successful
enterprises were characterized not so much by innovations in
chemical process as by the effective organization of the factors
of production within the prevailing scientiﬁc and technological
framework”. A formal body of knowledge, which could be trans-
ferred independently of personal experience, was slow to develop,
and inventions were conceived as solving immediate problems.
There was a deep wedge between scientiﬁc knowledge and in-
dustrial applications. The potting process for reﬁning pig iron,
patented in the early 1770s, was adopted only a decade later, when
other technical advances, which were developed independently,
made it commercially viable (Hyde, 1977: pp. 84–86). This was
also similar for smelting and puddling (Hyde, 1977: p. 117). Watt
waited seven years for his engine to become commercially viable,
duetothelackofregularproductionofthenecessaryparts(Landes,
1965: p. 333), as few ﬁrms specializing in machinery had appeared
(Musson & Robinson, 1969).
Integration of markets and the fungibility of entrepreneurs
allowed them a substantial mobility, across sectors and across
regions.§ Together with wide availability of technology and small
scale of operation, this resulted in low barriers to entry in most
sectors (Milward & Saul, 1973: p. 190; Hyde, 1977: p. 137). The
highdivisibilityofcapitalfavouredincrementalinvestment,sothat
capacity could be adjusted to the dynamics of demand (Feinstein &
Pollard, 1988: ch. 2–3). Reliance on standardized capital was
common in all sectors. The ﬁxed to working capital ratio was low
(Cameron, 1967: p. 16; Cottrell, 1985: p. 33)—rarely higher than
† Hyde (1977: ch. 12) provides examples of such attitude for the iron industry,
and Mathias (1979: p. 60) for steam power.
‡ Examples were coke smelting and steam power (Mathias, 1983).
§ Pollard (1964) Landes (1965: p. 304) and Musson and Robinson (1969: p.
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50%, and typically around 15%.† As a consequence buildings
accounted for a large share of capital and could themselves be
easily redeployed. Textile mills, for instance, were often general
purpose, so that they could be switched between different pro-
duction at low cost (Milward & Saul, 1973: p. 190).
The ﬁnancing patterns of early British industrial ﬁrms also
conform to the predictions of our model. Partners contributed most
of the start-up capital of their ﬁrms.‡ External ﬁnance was needed
mostly for working capital. Extremely rare were cases of bankers
providing start-up or ﬁxed capital (Cottrell, 1980: p. 15). When
this happened it was mostly to ﬁnance the industrial undertakings
of partners in the bank, and was usually, and predictably, a failure
(Pressnell, 1956: ch. 10).
Intermediation for the accumulation of industrial capital
emerged when London and local (“country”) bankers appeared
around the middle of the 18th century. They were all small part-
nerships—required by law not to exceed six members. London and
country bankers assumed different roles. Country bankers came
from trading and small industry, and provided local ﬁrms with
short-term credit (Pressnell, 1956). They always retained a strictly
local character: still in 1798, 98% of country banks were single
branched (Pressnell, 1956: p. 127). The number of such bankers
increased steadily with time: less than a dozen in 1750, they
became about 500 in the 1820s (Pressnell, 1956: p. 11). Low capital
requirements and light regulation contributed to keep banking
fairly competitive, and entry relatively easy (Cameron, 1967: p.
26).
Credit was extended through two main instruments: overdrafts
and “bills of exchange” (or “inland bills”). Bills were created by
ﬁrms accepting a payment obligation (usually a short-term re-
ceivable) from a debtor (typically a customer). Bills did not bring
anygovernancerightswiththem,justthepromisetopayaspeciﬁed
sum at maturity.§ Both bills and overdrafts were employed for
ﬁnancing the acquisition of working capital. Besides reputation,
the value of its working capital was an important determinant of
a ﬁrm’s credit availability (Pressnell, 1956: pp. 294–296).
Once issued, a bill was discounted by the local banker, who held
it to maturity or rediscounted it further with other bankers.¶
† Pollard (1964: pp. 301–304), Cameron (1967: pp. 36–38) and Mathias (1983:
p. 133) provide several examples.
‡ Anderson (1969), for instance, documents the wide use of mortgages to
provide funds for industrial ﬁrms in Lancashire, where the cotton industry
ﬂourished.
§ Pressnel (1956: p. 293) documents the efﬁciency of the collection system
which supported liquidation of assets backing bills of exchange.
¶ For a description of banking practices, see Rae (1896: pp. 238–251) and
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Rediscounting, which was the main source of reﬁnancing for coun-
try bankers, resulted in a ﬂow of funds across regions. Country
bankers in industrial (borrowing) counties provided bills, and their
colleagues of agricultural (lending) counties bought them to invest
the savings of their clients. London bankers provided a central
marketplace through which securities were channelled. The local
nature of country banks indeed required the existence of some
type of central intermediary (King, 1936: p. 6).
TheBankofEnglandhadbeenﬁnancingthegovernmentthrough
securities and loans, and about 50 bankers had been active in
London since the late 17th century to form a rudimentary money
market where public securities were exchanged.† They traded in
government securities and supplied asset management services to
merchants and wealthy aristocrats (Pressnell, 1956: p. 75; Cam-
eron, 1967: pp. 23–27). The pre-existence of a market for gov-
ernment debt then helped the rise of a market for private debt,
since it had already absorbed part of the cost of organizing it. Soon
London bankers were joined by bill brokers, who put in contact
country bankers with excess liquidity or a need for funds (Scam-
mell, 1968: pp. 117–119). Later on, discount houses also evolved
as agents for country bankers, providing them with discounting
services (Pressnell, 1956: ch. 4; Nevin & Davis, 1970: ch. 2). Thus,
a market for liquid securities allowed efﬁcient ﬁnancing ﬂows
across the country.‡
An important feature of the substantial anonymity of the market
was the low reliance on mechanisms of corporate control. Claims
were guaranteed by the assets of the acceptor of the receivable
and, in case of default, by all parties endorsing the bill (Pressnell,
1956: pp. 89–90; Easton, 1907: pp. 153–157). Bills had small value,
were backed by working capital and were issued by ﬁrms distant
from their lenders, so that these did not have the incentive to invest
in monitoring and control. Bankers, when initially discounting a
bill, checked that the short-term liquidity of the borrower was
adequate to the maturity and amount of the credit. This was
enough to keep them away from active governance of ﬁrms, as
they could cash the collateral in case of insolvency.
† Nevin and Davis (1970) and Collins (1984), among others, provide good
accounts of the early evolution of the British ﬁnancial system.
‡ Bisschop (1910: ch. 3), King (1936: ch. 1), Joslin (1966) and Anderson and
Cottrell (1974: pp. 151–155). It developed despite the fact that the Bank of
England refrained from granting bills much rediscounting, at least for those
rather common bills with more than 65 days to maturity (Scammell, 1968: p.
125; Richardson, 1974: p. 208). The Bank did so in order to defend its privileged
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3.3. GERMANY
Apart from occurring at a later point in time, the German in-
dustrialization exhibited a different pattern from the British one.
As in Britain, ﬁrms were mostly partnerships, though in Germany
“silent commandites” (Kommanditgesellschaften auf Aktien), in
which non-managing partners enjoyed limited liability, were also
allowed. German entrepreneurs took a more aggressive and riskier
attitude towards innovation than their British colleagues. They
aggressively pursued innovative businesses, becoming leaders in
the development of new technologies, and creating their own
markets by improving systematically on existing technology, in-
troducing new processes and developing new products (Landes,
1965: pp. 580–581). German industrialization was based more
on capital than on consumer goods, that is, in sectors where
technological prowess was more important.
Firms were managed by technically trained people who came
from a tradition of formal scientiﬁc education (Haber, 1958: p. 71;
Landes, 1965: pp. 375–380). Between 1851 and 1870, 38% of
entrepreneurs had a (mainly technical) academic background, up
from 16% in the previous two decades (Kocha, 1978: p. 533).
Formal technical training and practice enabled entrepreneurs to
understand advanced production technologies, and recognize the
value of envisioning innovation (Kocha, 1978: pp. 524–534). En-
trepreneurs themselves were often engineers or chemists, able to
quickly absorb foreign innovations and techniques, and improve
on them. German entrepreneurs constantly visited England and
France in order to learn their methods of production; Alfred Krupp,
for instance, visited Britain in 1838 to study steel production.†
Investmentinspeciﬁcknowledgeandhumancapitalhelpedthem
to adopt, and improve upon, state-of-the-art forms of production, in
all sectors (Landes, 1965). One example was the adoption of iron
coke smelting, which required the construction of specialized
plants. Its share of total iron production rose from 40% in 1852 to
88% in 1862 (Landes, 1965: p. 445). Other instances were the quick
adoption of cotton spinning (Landes, 1965: p. 452) and quick
development of custom machines for the textile industries in Sax-
ony and Westphalia (Henderson, 1984: pp. 144–148). This reliance
on technical prowess and on innovation became the hallmark of
German industry. Production of steel was based on the exploitation
of the Siemens–Martin process, more technical and costly than the
Bessemer process which was adopted by most British producers
(Landes, 1965: p. 488). In mining and iron-making a large demand
was generated by the construction of the railway network—mostly
† Henderson (1984: ch. 6) reports similar cases of entrepreneurial activism in
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in the 1840s and 1850s.† The ability to incorporate quickly the
technical advances which took so much time to develop in England
allowed ﬁrms in Rhenania and Westphalia to supply a large part
of the required iron and steel—though imports from Britain were
substantial, indigenous production grew faster than demand.‡
The German chemical industry provides a major example of
investment in technical capacity. The constant development of new
processes and products allowed German chemical ﬁrms, managed
by professional chemists, to establish themselves at an early stage.
German entrepreneurs turned chemicals into a fundamentally
“scientiﬁc” industry that was the most innovative and the most
technical.§ The quick adoption of the Leblanc soda process, which
had long been neglected in Britain, is a clear example of this ability
to adopt successfully the discoveries of others. In sulphuric acid,
the French discoveries by Cle ￿ment, De ￿sarnes and Gay-Lussac were
also implemented quickly and proﬁtably (Haber, 1958: p. 10). A
similar pattern was that of metallurgy, which like the Thomas–
Martin process, was originated abroad and to be widely adopted
in Germany. Of foremost importance was the quick development of
the synthetic dyes industry, which was started by the serendipitous
discoveries of Perkins (a Briton) in 1856. In 1862 there were nine
British and seven German ﬁrms (Beer, 1959: p. 30; Milward &
Saul, 1973: pp. 229–238). For the rest of the decade the British
ﬁrmsenjoyeda“ﬁrstmover”advantage,anddominatedthisrapidly
growing market. They seemed secure, as dyes were primarily used
in textiles, where Britain had a large share of the market. However,
German ﬁrms developed strong, and costly, technical capabilities,
while British ﬁrms never went further than simple reﬁnements of
Perkins’ basic methods. By the early 1870s the ﬁeld was dominated
bytheaggressiveGermanﬁrms:BASF,AGFA,BayerandHoechst.¶
This pattern of investment in new technology was not limited to
inherently “scientiﬁc” sectors like chemicals, for instance, cus-
tomized textile machinery also developed quickly and soon Ger-
many became a net exporter (Milward & Saul, 1973: p. 196).
TheGermanﬁnancialsystemstronglysupportedsuchaggressive
and risky investments in new technology. It indeed exhibited the
† The German railway length grew from 6 km in 1835, to 2143 km in 1845,
7826 km in 1855 and 13 900 km in 1865 (Mitchell, 1980: table G1).
‡ The production of pig iron rose by more than 300% between 1840 and 1860,
and by the same rate over the next decade. The production of coal rose by 400%
between 1840 and 1860, and more than doubled over the next decade (Tilly, 1966:
p. 9). One reason for this success was also the (technically demanding) vertical
integration between coal and iron mines, which was adopted much more quickly
than in Britain (Landes, 1965: p. 491).
§ Landau and Murmann (1997) reconstruct how German ﬁrms caught up with
British ones by the early 170s, and provide further references.
¶ For a more detailed account of the development of the German chemical
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features predicted by our model. By contrast with Britain, a large
fraction of investment was ﬁnanced externally. One reason was
the lower wealth of German entrepreneurs. Another was the large
share of ﬁxed, over working capital due to the concentration on
mining and specialized productions. Intermediation emerged in
the form of Privatbankiers. They were small local partnerships
with unlimited liability. Corporate banks were slow to form since
charters were sparingly granted to banks until the liberalization
of incorporation in 1871.† There were, however, few regulations
restricting entry for non-incorporated banks. Privatbankiers con-
centrated in the most economically active regions: the Rheinish
and Ruhr districts, and Berlin.‡ During the 1830s the most active
among them started ﬁnancing local industrial ﬁrms.
Privatbankiers ﬁnanced capital accumulation with forms of ﬁn-
ance that gave them substantial control rights—such as rolled-
over current account advances or shareholdings. Bankers often
took up managerial positions in their clients’ ﬁrms, as en-
trepreneurs had little training in management.§ Shareholdings
were the other common way used to extend industrial ﬁnance. Not
only did bankers participate in equity capital, but they also actively
fostered new ventures, encouraging entrepreneurs to assume high
risks (Da Rin, 1996). Close relations between bankers and en-
trepreneurs were a main factor in granting credit; except for
mortgages, collateral was little used (Tilly, 1966: pp. 83–91). Bank-
ers were often members of the board (Auﬁschtsrat) of joint-stock
companies (Aktiengesellshaften), or took part in the management
board (Vorstand) of limited liability partnership (Kom-
manditgesellshaften auf Aktien). Most Rheinish joint-stock com-
panies founded between 1830 and 1870 thus had at least one
banker on their board, due to shareholdings, statutory privileges
or proxy votes, which were popular from the outset (Tilly, 1966:
ch. 7). A few of the larger Privatbankiers, and a handful of joint-
stock banks, engaged in investment banking activities, organizing
shares and bonds issues for their clients. Issues were ﬂoated on
the local stock exchanges (Berlin, Frankfurt, Ko ¨ln, Hamburg,
Munich).
In contrast with Britain, Akzepten (titles of credit similar to bills
of exchange) were used sparingly (they amounted to less than a
quarter of bank assets), mainly with trade-oriented industries like
textiles. Markets for bills were local and thin, their circulation
† Riesser (1911), Tilly (1966) and Pohl (1982) provide a comprehensive treat-
ment of the history of German banking.
‡ For a comprehensive study of Rheinish Privatbankiers, see Tilly (1966).
§ Tilly (1966: ch. 6), shows that advances accounted for around 50% of the
total assets of Rheinish Privatbankiers throughout the 1860s. Da Rin (1966)
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hampered by different state legislations and obstacles to the cir-
culation of information. Local money markets then developed late
and slowly.† Therefore, both sources and destinations of ﬁnance
were by and large regional, and no national capital market existed
until uniﬁcation.‡
Bankers developed the skills and capabilities for technically
evaluating ventures and for playing an active role in corporate
governance. They engaged in coordination activities such as circu-
lating information among clients, consulting, arranging ac-
quisitions or suggesting new businesses, in a fashion which
resembles modern venture capital activities.§ It was common for
a banker to help its clients ﬁnd customers and suppliers, lobby
with local authorities and provide legal counselling. This brought
about an intimate knowledge of businesses which allowed bankers
a careful appraisal of their prospects. This was crucial both for
start-ups and for ﬁrms which ran in distress, for which the li-
quidation decision could be taken efﬁciently. Shareholdings also
encouraged banks to avoid liquidation whenever economically ef-
ﬁcient, since they could then participate in future proﬁts. Consider
again the chemical sector. Firms like BASF, AGFA and Degussa
were all founded and incorporated with the assistance of Pri-
vatbankiers, who invested in their equity, and allowed them to
take a long investment horizon.¶
4. Conclusion
This paper has proposed the role of economic integration as one
important determinant of the emergence and evolution of al-
ternative patterns of industrial ﬁnance and investment. Drawing
on recent contributions in corporate ﬁnance, our model has char-
acterized the role economic integration plays in favouring bank-
vs. market-based patterns of industrialization, and the conditions
under which their persistence should be expected. Thus, we have
† Only after the 1850s in the most active region, Rheineland (Tilly, 1966: p.
72).
‡ Riesser (1911: pp. 30–35). The ﬁnancial press only developed in the late
1850s, and dealt mainly with Frankfurt.
§ Riessser (1911) provides several such instances and Da Rin (1966) an in-
terpretation of them.
¶ Kirchga ¨sser (1988: pp. 68–69) details the involvement of the banker W. H.
Ladenburg with BASF, and earlier with its predecessor, the Chemische Fabrik
Sonntag, Engelhorn, Dyckerhoff und Clemm, founded in 1862. AFGA was founded
in Berlin in 1867 with the help by the banker Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, who also
became a partner. Also its parent company, Kunheim, had been founded with
the help of a banker (Haber, 1958: p. 48). DEGUSSA, later to become a leader
in electrochemicals, received credit from Jewish Frankfurt houses to establish
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provided one of the still few contributions to comparative ﬁnancial
theory.
The model has proved a useful guide in the interpretation of the
early industrializations of the British and German economies. In
Britain production was organized in a fungible way, and innovation
was the result of slow accumulation and improvements on existing
processes and technologies. Their entrepreneurial spirit kept
human capital highly redeployable. Finance was provided by arm’s-
length bankers, through liquid securities traded in the discount
market. Securities gave no control rights to creditors, but ensured
a relatively efﬁcient liquidation process. In Germany, production
developed with emphasis on innovation. Entrepreneurs, often tech-
nically trained, adopted risky projects and adopted specialized
forms of production, concentrating on technologically oriented cap-
ital goods sectors. Finance, based on shareholdings and long-term
loans, gave much power to creditors, and allowed them to inﬂuence
managers. Late integration resulted in Germany retaining its
initial pattern of ﬁnance and investment. The historic process of
equilibrium selection well reﬂects the predictions of our model.
Beyond their contribution to the understanding of the early
phases of industrialization of modern economies, these results
provide material for designing economic policy in developing or
transitionaleconomies.Inparticular,somelightisshedonthelong-
term effects of the interaction between ﬁnancial and technological
choices in a developing economy. More research is certainly neces-
sary to develop a fuller understanding of the effects of the “political
economy” of a nation on its pattern of development. The present
work has simply tried to provide a rigorous conceptual framework
to guide an empirical recognition of the ﬁrst two cases of in-
dustrialization.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. First, notice that our model is time-
independent, in the sense that under both ﬁnancial regimes the
equilibrium values of variables do not depend on their pre-
determined values. So we can drop time subscripts. From equation
(4) we can derive the equilibrium value of the wage rate as a
function of F: w=g¢(1/F). Then denote with d(B)o2B/
1/2B
0 b(1/
B-z)dz the price paid by ﬁrms for bank monitoring. It is easy to
check that k(B)=2F(1-b)/f(1+r). We can modify equation (5) to
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c[p(g¢(1/F),s=s,e ¯)-(1+r)(1+e ¯)-(1-b)d(B)]=0
together with equation (3) this gives the (unique) equilibrium
numberofbanksandﬁrms,whichwedenotebyB* b andF* b.Stability
follows from the slope of labour demand, and the fact that the
right-hand side of equation (5) is negatively sloped in wt+1. F
Proof of Proposition 2. From equation (4¢) we get the equi-
librium value of the wage rate: w=g¢(1/bF). We can insert it into
equation (5¢) which gives the equilibrium number of brokers, which
wedenotebyB* m.Thenequation(3¢)isusedtoderivetheequilibrium
number of ﬁrms, which we denote by F* m. Stability follows as in
Proposition 1. F
Proof of Proposition 3. From equation (5¢) and the continuity
of q it follows that k(F)/q increases as q goes to zero. Then there
exists a value q* such that the right-hand side of equation (5¢)i s
higher than the left-hand side for any level of Ft. Therefore, the
market-based equilibrium cannot attain for q<q*. F
Proof of Proposition 4. Once the economy achieves a degree of
integration q1 both equilibria are in principle feasible. Since the
economy belongs to xm it would adopt the market-based equi-
librium, in the static model.† However, now the cost-saving in
banking has to be taken into account. Thus, the decision on which
equilibrium attains boils down to comparing the net total product
which is generated in either case.
Using equations (3)–(5) and (3¢)–(5¢) we achieve the net social
product for both cases. For the market-based equilibrium we have:





where we take into account that ﬁrms’ proﬁts depend on the degree
ofintegrationthroughequation(6).Forthebank-basedequilibrium
we have:
c[p(F* b)F* b-(d(B)F* m-xcF* b)]-(1+r)[e ¯F* b]-(1+r)Bfb (8)
By comparing these two expressions, it is then possible to derive
the value c* 1 which equates them. Whenever c³c*1 the economy
† A technical point. Notice that xm generically depends on the degree of
integration q. We thus focus on the case where the economy belongs to xm(i) for
all q³q1. This is the case where we woud least expect the economy to persist in
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gain from preserving bank ﬁnance is high enough to ensure its
persistence. When c<c* 1, instead, the cost saving due to preserved
ﬁnancial relations is not high enough, and the economy reverts to
market-based ﬁnance. F